The Move from \u3cem\u3eIs\u3c/em\u3e to \u3cem\u3eGood\u3c/em\u3e in Environmental Ethics by Nolt, John
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Faculty Publications and Other Works -- 
Philosophy Philosophy 
July 2009 
The Move from Is to Good in Environmental Ethics 
John Nolt 
University of Tennessee - Knoxville, nolt@utk.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_philpubs 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Logic and Foundations of Mathematics 
Commons, and the Metaphysics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nolt, John, "The Move from Is to Good in Environmental Ethics" (2009). Faculty Publications and Other 
Works -- Philosophy. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_philpubs/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at TRACE: Tennessee Research and 
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Other Works -- Philosophy by an 




Moves from is to good—that is, principles that link fact to value—are fundamental to envi-
ronmental ethics. The upshot is fourfold: (1) for nonanthropogenic goods, only those moves 
from is to good are defensible which conceive goodness as goodness for biotic entities; (2) 
goodness for nonsentient biotic entities is contribution to their autopoietic functioning; (3) 
biotic entities also function “exopoietically” to benefit related entities, and these exopoietic 
benefits are on average greater than their own goods; and (4) the most general is-to-good 
principles that are defensible (and hence the ones of greatest importance for environmental 
ethics) concern a realm of nonanthropogenic goodness that encompasses both living and 
nonliving nature.
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Joint ISEE/IAEP Conference in Allenspark, Colorado. The author thanks Heather Douglas, John kress, 
Holmes Rolston, III, Clerk Shaw, Allen Thompson, and anonymous referees for Environmental Ethics 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
 1 Holmes Rolston, III, environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the natural World (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 230–31.
 2 A species for Rolston is “a living historical form . . . propagated in individual organisms, that 
flows dynamically over generations” (ibid., p. 135). “Genetically, though not neurally, a species over 
generations ‘learns’ (discovers) pathways previously unknown. . . .There is a specific groping for a 
valued ought-to-be beyond what now is in any individual. Though species are not moral agents, a bio-
logical identity—a kind of value—is here defended” (ibid., p. 143). “[P]rocesses of value found first 
in an organic individual reappear at the specific level: defending a particular form of life, pursuing a 




 Holmes Rolston, III has observed that reasoning in environmental ethics often 
exhibits what he calls a “transition from is to good and thence to ought.”1 The 
following argument (from his environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the 
Natural World) is a case in point:
(1) Species defend particular forms of life, pursue pathways through the world, 
resist extinction, regenerate, exhibit creative resilience and maintain a 
normative identity over time.
(2) Moral concern is appropriate to entities that engage in such processes of 
value.
(3) So, moral concern is appropriate to species.2
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pathway through the world, resisting death (extinction), regeneration maintaining a normative identity 
over time, storied achievements, creative resilience learning survival skills. If, at the specific level, 
these processes are just as evident or even more so, what prevents duties from arising at that level? The 
appropriate survival unit is the appropriate level of moral concern” (ibid., p. 151).
 3 For more examples, see John Nolt, “The Move from Good to Ought in Environmental Ethics,” 
Environmental Ethics 28  (2006): 355–74.
The first premise expresses the move from is to good, i.e., from fact to value. It as-
serts that to anything that has a certain empirical attribute (in this case the attribute of 
being a species) there belong certain values (in this case defending particular forms 
of life, pursuing pathways through the world, resisting extinction, regenerating, 
exhibiting creative resilience and maintaining a normative identity over time). The 
second premise expresses the move from good to ought, i.e., from value to moral 
duty. It says that we have a certain duty (in this case a duty of moral concern) in 
regard to anything that has the kind of value mentioned in the first premise. The 
conclusion is a principle of environmental ethics.
 More generally, the class of such arguments can be characterized by the follow-
ing schema:
All F has good (or value) G (is to good),
we ought to V whatever has G (good to ought),
we ought to V whatever has F (is to ought),
where F is some attribute that defines a class of natural entities, G is a good or 
value, and the variable V is to be replaced by a transitive verb specifying a moral 
attitude or action (e.g., “protect,” “promote,” “respect,” “consider the consequences 
of our actions for”). Arguments of this form are common in the literatures of both 
environmental ethics and animal ethics3—though, of course, not all arguments for 
environmental ethical principles have this form. 
 The form itself is valid. Any controversy must therefore lie with the premises. In 
an earlier paper, I surveyed and evaluated justifications for various instances of the 
second premise, the move from good to ought. Here I attempt a similar survey and 
evaluation for instances of the first, the move from is to good. That is, I consider, 
one by one, various moves from is to good in environmental ethics, finding reasons 
to reject some and accept others. This survey yields four main conclusions:
(1)  For nonanthropogenic goods, only those moves from is to good are de-
fensible which conceive goodness as goodness for biotic entities.
(2) Goodness for non-sentient biotic entities is contribution to their autopoietic 
functioning.
(3) Biotic entities often function “exopoietically” to benefit related entities, 
often at other levels of organization, and these exopoietic benefits are on 
average greater than their own goods.
(4) The most general is to good principles that are defensible (and hence the 
ones of greatest importance for environmental ethics) concern a realm of 
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 4 My description of this circumstance is, of course, dependent on the form of our language. But 
the natural phenomena thus described predated us and are independent of our description of them. 
Antirealists may find this claim contentious. My reply can be found in John Nolt, “An Argument for 
Metaphysical Realism,” zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2004): 71–90.
nonanthropogenic goodness that encompasses both living and nonliving 
nature.
The Move froM is To GooD in environMenTaL eThics
THE SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION
 To keep the discussion manageable, I limit it primarily to is-to-good moves in 
which the good G is conceived as nonanthropogenic. Many environmental goods 
are “anthropogenic,” in the sense that their being goods presupposes the existence of 
human values. Mountains that have certain features, for example, are recreationally 
good, but their goodness does not lie merely in those features (e.g., composition 
of rock, complement of flora and fauna, quality of snow pack), but also in the fact 
that some people value recreational activities associated with them (e.g., climbing, 
hiking, or skiing). The natural is (embodied the mountains’ features) constitutes 
recreational goodness only in conjunction with human valuing.
 Other forms of goodness, however, are entirely independent of human valuers. Black 
bears find chestnuts good to eat, and their doing so has nothing to do with us.4 Sunlight 
and water are goods for photosynthetic plants. These goods are “nonanthropogenic.” 
They were good for their respective organisms before humans appeared on Earth 
and would still have been good in the same way if we had never evolved. Because 
it is concern with such nonanthropogenic goods that makes environmental ethics 
theoretically unique and significant, it is on them that this discussion focuses.
 There is one more restriction on the discussion. As I explained in the previous 
paper, a thing’s being good for an entity is logically independent of whether we 
have duties to preserve or protect that entity or that good. Thus, by themselves 
is-to-good moves imply nothing about how we ought to treat natural entities. To 
obtain from them principles of environmental ethics, we must conjoin them with 
moves from good to ought. Since I am concerned here just with moves from is to 
good, any question of how we ought to act with respect to such goods or the enti-
ties whose goods they are is beyond the scope of this paper. 
THE GOODNESS OF NATURE
 The romantic in many of us wants to see nature as benevolent. Thus, we may be 
tempted to make this move from is to good:
 Anything natural is good. 
But this claim is refuted by what medieval philosophers called “natural evils”: 
disease, parasitism, infection, genetic disorder, injury, suffering, premature death, 
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 5 It was, however, typical in medieval philosophy to think of them as consequences somehow of the 
Fall. 
 6 My criticism of teleological leaps should not be understood as a rejection of teleology per se, but 
only of ill-founded or non-natural teleology. I regard it as obvious that organisms and other biotic 
entities are teleological in that they strive to reproduce, sustain themselves, etc.
and the like. These conditions are natural because they occur without human 
agency.5 They are evils in the sense of being harms. The existence of natural evils 
implies that not everything natural is good—or at least that not everything natural 
is good for every creature. 
 The romantic may persist: perhaps nature is generally good in spite of natural 
evils. The problem of explaining how a benevolent nature could co-exist with natural 
evils is analogous to the problem of evil in theology (the problem of explaining 
how an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God could co-exist with natural 
evils and sin). Indeed, the two problems generate similar dialectics. In both cases, 
once the futility of denying natural evils becomes evident, the next step is often 
to insist that they all are somehow beneficial—to retreat, in other words, from the 
sweeping claim that everything natural is good to the more modest principle that 
everything natural is good for something. That retreat is prudent, but insufficient. 
Nature is remarkably inventive at turning the misfortunes of some creatures into 
the goods of others. But to inflate this inventiveness into a universal principle is 
unwarranted. was there never harm without benefit? Is nothing in nature merely 
indifferent?
  A flagrantly Pollyannaish romanticism may in the end resort to the desperate 
claim that nature as a whole somehow always works out for the best. wrong again. 
when at last in the natural course of its evolution the sun exhausts its hydrogen, 
expands into a red giant star and incinerates earthly life, that will not be for the 
best. 
 Or will it? There is, of course, no clear sense in which the Earth’s incineration 
will be for the best for any earthly living thing or for earthly life as a whole. But it 
just might be for the best relative to some broader context of value—perhaps the 
welfare of certain extraterrestrials or the designs of God. we have, however, no 
knowledge of such a broader context, and so we cannot successfully appeal to it 
in justifying moves from is to good.
 we see here a simple and straightforward instance of a pattern that will appear 
elsewhere in our discussion. I call it the “teleological leap.” The pattern is this: 
we want to regard as good something that is not known to be good for any biotic 
entity; so we explain that goodness by reference, either implicit or explicit, to sup-
posed purposes or values that are unknown. Any successful move from is to good 
in environmental ethics will have to do better than that.6 
THE GOODNESS OF BEING
 There is an even broader, is-to-good principle that features prominently in me-
dieval metaphysics:
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 7 Augustine, Confessions, bk. 7, chap. 12.
 whatever has being is good.7 
Augustine uses this idea to solve the theological problem of evil; but, if true, it 
would also support belief in nature’s goodness. Evils in general (both natural evils 
and sin) are, according to Augustine, forms of nonbeing, i.e., deprivation. Hence, 
God did not create evil, since what has no being was not created. Everything God 
did create, then, must be good, though not all of it is perfect. Because natural 
evils are mere deprivations, they can co-exist with a fundamentally good nature. 
Everything in nature is good—insofar as it has being at all. 
 The qualification “insofar as it has being at all” is crucial, for Augustine assumes 
that being, like goodness, comes in degrees. It is obvious, of course, that goodness 
comes in degrees. But Augustine also inherits two Platonic assumptions: (1) that 
the higher the degree of goodness the higher the degree of being and (2) that there 
is a unique highest degree of goodness: perfection. Thus, he holds that everything 
is good (or approximates perfection) in proportion to its degree of being. This (in 
a slightly more explicit form) is the is-to-good principle mentioned at the outset 
of this section. 
 But this principle presupposes a natural hierarchy of degrees of being that is no 
longer plausible. Besides, it is too indiscriminate; it finds goodness everywhere—
in every miniscule photon and every lifeless asteroid, as well as in every living 
thing. If we ask, “In what way are all these things good?” Augustine may make 
a teleological leap: they are good for the purposes of God. But we cannot make 
such a leap, for we do not know the purposes of God, and we have no naturalistic 
explanation of how such an indiscriminate goodness could be good at all. 
THE GOODNESS OF PERFECTION
 while Augustine’s identification of goodness with being is passé, his identification 
of goodness with approximation to perfection can still seem obvious. The apparent 
obviousness dissolves, however, upon closer examination, for in the biological realm, 
at least, we can no longer make much sense of the idea of perfection. From Plato 
onward, much of the western tradition held that for each biological species there 
was a single immutable form that defined the ideal of perfection for its members. 
But that notion has two fatal flaws: (1) it is incompatible with Darwinian biology, 
and (2) even if it were not, it is no longer clear why perfection in that sense should 
be good at all.
  There are no immutable species forms because species’ gene pools are in con-
stant flux as environmental conditions change. That flux tends not toward some 
fixed ideal of perfection, but toward the moving target of fitness—or else toward 
extinction. Nor is fitness itself an ideal, a maximally good state. It is, rather, a 
matter of sufficiency—the ability to reproduce under existing conditions. we 
cannot even regard the individual’s genome as encoding an ideal toward which it 
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 8 The term perfection itself is in Greek teleion—a cognate of telos. It signifies the ultimate self-
sufficient completion toward which things tend. (Thanks to John kress for this point.) Plato’s notion 
of things striving for but falling short of their forms is expressed in Phaedo 74d–75a. For an excellent 
account of Aristotle’s views on these matters, see John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Natural Teleology,” 
in John M. Cooper, Knowledge, Nature and the Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
pp. 107–29; originally published in Malcolm Schonfield and Martha Craven Nussbaum, eds., Language 
and Logos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 197–222.
 9 Jenny Teichman, “Good For and Good About,” Philosophy 78 (2003): 117. 
unfolds, for some genomic “blueprints” are better than others, and their goodness 
is not intrinsic to themselves, but rather a matter of how well they suit the organ-
ism for the environments that it will chance to encounter. There is better or worse 
for individual organisms, certainly; but there is no reason to think that the “better 
than” relation has a single maximum: the uniquely perfect ideal.
 Moreover, even if, despite Darwin, there did exist some unique ideal of perfec-
tion for each organism, the question would still remain: why would perfection in 
that sense be good—good how and for what? The tradition had various teleological 
answers. Plato and Aristotle explained the goodness of perfection by positing a 
natural tendency of things to strive for, imitate, or approximate their ideal forms.8 
Perfection was good for an organism, then, because to realize its ideal form was its 
natural end, its telos. In medieval theology, standards of perfection were regarded 
as divinely ordained. Since Darwin, however, there has been no reason to believe 
in ideals that function either as goals toward which organisms naturally strive or 
as standards set for them by divine decree. This is not to say that organisms lack 
purpose, but only that they lack the specific purpose of realizing ideals. In what 
sense, then, could realization of an ideal (even supposing such things existed) be 
good for them—or, indeed, good at all?
GOODNESS-ABOUT AND FOOT’S “NATURAL GOODNESS”
 Surprisingly, some contemporary thinkers still seem to hold that biological 
goodness can be defined as approximation to a kind-ideal. Jenny Teichman, for 
example, writes:
 what is good about an animal is whatever makes the individual creature a good 
specimen of its kind; what is bad about it is whatever constitutes a defect, illness, 
weakness or disability in that sort of animal.9
Teichman distinguishes what is good about an organism from what is good for 
it. what is good for it is what it needs to stay alive and healthy. I have no quarrel 
with this conception of goodness-for and will elaborate on it shortly. But goodness-
about, as Teichman defines it, seems to presuppose the sort of notion of species- or 
kind-ideal that I have just argued is no longer tenable. Can that really be what 
she is up to? 
 Teichman’s notion of goodness-about is inspired by Philippa Foot’s conception of 
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 10 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) and Alasdair MacIntyre, De-
pendent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), esp. 
pp. 64–65.
 11 Michael Thompson, “The Representation of Life,” in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and 
Moral Theory, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin  Lawrence, and warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), p. 295.
 12 Foot, ibid., pp. 30–31.
 13 Ibid., p. 29.
natural goodness, together with a similar idea propounded by Alasdair MacIntyre.10 
Foot, in turn, bases her account of natural goodness on Michael Thompson’s analy-
sis of natural-historical judgments—such statements as “rabbits eat grass,” where 
“rabbits” refers not to individual rabbits but to a collective “life form.” Thompson 
holds that such judgments are in a certain sense normative; the statement “rabbits 
eat grass” implies, for example, that rabbits that do not eat grass are defective.11 
Foot agrees, with the proviso that the judgment is normative only if the property 
(in this case the property of eating grass) predicated of the life form (in this case 
“rabbits”) contributes to that life form’s self-maintenance or reproduction.12 Natural 
goodness is, then, on her account, the capacity of an organism to maintain itself 
and reproduce in ways appropriate to its kind. 
 Anticipating the Darwinian objection to species ideals, Foot concedes that the 
relevant “kind” is not the species as a whole but some “still” or time slice of it. Of 
Thompson’s natural-historical judgments, she writes:
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Their truth is truth about a species at a given historical time, and it is only the relative 
stability of at least the most general features of different species of living things that 
makes these propositions possible at all. They tell how a kind of plant or animal, con-
sidered at a particular time and in its natural habitat, develops, sustains itself, defends 
itself, and reproduces. It is only in so far as “stills” can be made from the moving 
picture of the evolution of species that we can have a natural history account of the 
life of a particular kind of living thing.13
Foot, then—and hence, presumably, also Teichman—does not rely on the notion 
of an immutable species ideal. The ideal (if ideal it is) is time-relative. Foot also 
hints that there is some relativity to habitat, so that “kind” might turn out to be 
something quite temporary and local. Foot’s move from is to good might thus be 
expressed as follows:
An organism is naturally good to the extent that it is capable of living the life 
appropriate to its (temporary and, perhaps, local) kind.
 But so deep a concession to Darwin blurs the notion of a kind. How thick should 
we make the time slice? How wide is the population and how varied are the habitats 
that determine a particular organism’s kind? Various answers are possible; none seems 
privileged. what once was for each organism a single well-defined species ideal thus 
disintegrates into a fuzzy multiplicity of overlapping temporary and local “kinds.” 
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 14 Categories (1) and (2) correspond respectively to what Ernest Partridge calls dyadic and monadic 
conceptions of evaluation. See Earnest Partridge, “Values in Nature: Is Anybody There?” in Louis P. 
Pojman, ed., Environmental Ethics, 2d ed. (Belmont, Calif.: wadsworth, 1998), pp. 81–88; this is a 
revised version of an article that first appeared in Philosophical Inquiry 8 (1986): 97–110.
 15 I do not mean to suggest that this would trouble either Foot or Thompson. But it may be a problem 
for Teichman, who seems to hold that goodness-about is a distinct form of goodness.
 Perhaps, nevertheless, we can successfully rank organisms on a scale of ap-
proximation to such fuzzy and multiple kind-ideals. Suppose we can. Still, the 
question remains: in what way is Teichman’s goodness-about—that is being a 
“good” specimen of one’s kind—good? In the next section, I argue that the only 
defensible way in which it can be good renders it superfluous.
GOODNESS FOR BIOTIC ENTITIES AS THE ONLy 
DEFENSIBLE FORM OF NONANTHROPOGENIC GOODNESS
 The ways in which a condition can be good can be divided into two broad 
categories: (1) it is good in that it is good for some entity (that is, contributes to 
that entity’s well-being) or (2) it is good not in that it is good for any entity, but 
in some other way.14 Answers of the first type can be further divided into three 
subcategories: the condition is good either in that (1A) it is good for humans, or 
(1B) it is good for nonhuman biotic entities, or (1C) it is good for non-biotic enti-
ties. (A condition could, of course, be good in more than one of these ways.) By 
“biotic entities” I mean not only organisms (including human persons), but also 
functionally organized aggregates of organisms (e.g., colonies, species, nations) 
and their functionally organized components (e.g., genes, cells, organ systems). 
 Goods of category (1A) are anthropogenic. If there were no human values, there 
would be no such goods. “Good” specimens of a kind can indeed be good in this 
way—in that, for example, they fulfill human desires for order, beauty, functional 
integrity, etc. A tiger that is “good” in this way might, for example, be one that 
elegantly meets human desiderata for tigers. But neither Foot nor Teichman (nor 
I) is concerned with such anthropogenic values—though sometimes they seem to 
lie confusedly in the background of the discussion. I mention category (1A) only 
to mark it off clearly and set it aside. It is irrelevant here. 
 Goods of category (1B) are, by contrast, quite relevant. These are conditions that 
are good in that they are good for some nonhuman biotic entity. An answer of type 
(1B) to the question “in what way is Teichman’s goodness-about good?” might run 
as follows: it is good in that it is good for the organism itself, or its social group, 
its offspring, its species, or the like. That is a fine answer, and I have no objection 
to it. But it renders Teichman’s distinction between goodness-for and goodness-
about superfluous, for what makes an organism a “good” specimen of its kind on 
this view is simply that it has certain properties good for the organism itself or for 
related biotic entities. This answer reduces goodness-about to goodness-for.15
 It might be objected that such a reduction puts the cart before the horse, since 
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 16 Thompson, “Representation of Life,” p. 295.
 17 Tools employed by nonhuman animals are an exception, but these introduce no new consid-
erations. If chimps find a modified stick good for pulling termites out of their nests, its goodness is 
goodness-for biotic entities (the chimps). There may come a time when such artifacts as robots are 
sufficiently autopoietic (see discussion of autopoiesis below) to count as having goods of their own. 
If so, then conditions will be good for these artifacts independently of the values of their makers and 
users, and value theory will have to accommodate this development.
we cannot say what is good for a specimen without knowing the standards of its 
kind. Thompson, for example, raises such a challenge:
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If, though, we want to apply “normative” categories to subrational nature, and apart 
from any relation to “our interests,” then the questions inevitably arise, and not so 
unreasonably: where does the standard come from? what supplies the measure? The 
system of natural-historical propositions with a given kind as subject supplies such a 
standard for members of that kind.16
Thompson is right to this extent: in learning and explaining what is good for a par-
ticular organism, we typically appeal to our general knowledge of the life-ways of 
related organisms—but merely as relevant information, not as an absolute standard. 
Goodness for an individual cannot be defined as its approximation to a standard 
natural-historical description, for two reasons: (1) not everything that occurs in the 
standard natural history of an organism is good for it—a point which I elaborate on 
in the section below entitled “Goodness for Non-Sentient Organisms as Healthy 
Achievement of Life Cycle Stages”—and (2) even closely related individuals may 
vary in such way that what is good for some need not be good for all. Even if all 
rabbits but one eat grass, it does not follow that the one’s abstention is bad for 
it. To summarize, if goodness-about is a good of category (1B), it is reducible to 
goodness-for, but goodness-for cannot be defined in terms of goodness-about. 
 There remain only two ways of conceiving goodness-about—as a good of either 
category (1C) or category (2). Goods of category (1C) are goods for non-biotic entities. 
But which non-biotic entities? Natural non-biotic entities do not have goods. There 
is no good or bad for a cloud, a star, or a rock. Artifacts can have goods (sharpening 
may be good for a knife), but all such goods are ultimately anthropogenic.17 That 
leaves non-natural entities. One can imagine a condition being good in that it is 
good for a ghost, a god, or some other non-natural (and hence unknown) entity, but 
only by a teleological leap. Thus, there are no defensible nonanthropogenic sorts 
of goodness in category (1C).
 The only remaining way to achieve a distinct conception of goodness-about is 
option (2), the idea of what I call “free-floating goods”—conditions that are good, 
though their goodness does not consist in being good for anything at all. A certain 
sort of Platonist, for example, might hold that a ruby’s participation in the form 
Ruby is just good, even if not good for anything at all. Likewise, one might claim 
that a tiger’s being a “good” specimen of its (perhaps temporary and local) kind is 
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 18 In an early paper, “The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic,” Environmental Ethics 
3 (1981): 19–34, Tom Regan suggested in effect that there might be goods of category (2). But Ernest 
Partridge provided a convincing refutation of Regan’s suggestion; see Partridge, “Values in Nature,” 
pp. 81–88. Partridge ultimately concludes that “the only so-called ‘values’ in the biotic community 
are ‘values-for’ some organism”—a view that is similar to mine, except that it is restricted to organ-
isms, while I hold that biotic entities that are not organisms also have goods. See also Ernest Partridge, 
“Discovering a world of Values: A Response to Rolston,” in Pojman, Environmental Ethics, p. 92.
 19 See Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986).
something good about the tiger without being good for anything at all. This good-
ness, then, would seem to be just a brute and inexplicable fact. But no one, so far 
as I know, has made such a claim (none of the authors discussed above explicitly 
asserts that a condition can be good about an entity without being good for anything 
at all), and it is hard to see how one could even begin to argue for it.18 There is, 
therefore, so far as I can see, no defensible nonanthropogenic notion of goodness-
about distinct from goodness-for.  
 The pattern of reasoning by which this conclusion was reached can, I think, be 
generalized to show that there are no defensible sorts of nonanthropogenic goods 
of any sort distinct from goodness for biotic entities. The pattern is this: take any 
alleged contender for such a nonanthropogenic good and ask systematically, us-
ing categories (1A), (1B), (1C) and (2), in what way it is good. If it is a good of 
category (1A), it is anthropogenic. If it is entirely a good of category (1B), then it 
reduces to goods-for. If it is a good of category (1C), then it is either non-natural 
and thus indefensible or anthropogenic. Finally, if it is a nonanthropogenic good of 
category (2), it will, I contend, turn out to be indefensible, for it is difficult to see 
how one could show that a condition can be good without being good for anything 
at all.
GOODNESS AS INHERENT VALUE
 In this section, I apply this pattern of reasoning to what is perhaps the most obvious 
contender for a nonanthropogenic good that is not reducible to goods-for: inherent 
value or inherent worth. (when not discussing the views of a particular author, I 
use these two terms interchangeably.) I argue, in particular, that inherent worth 
as conceived by Paul w. Taylor and inherent value as conceived by Tom Regan 
both contain anthropogenic elements, and that if we bracket these anthropogenic 
elements, what we arrive at are, once again, merely goods of category (1B)—that 
is, goods for nonhuman biotic entities. 
 Taylor’s notion of what he calls “inherent worth” is a curious hybrid.19 An en-
tity’s having inherent worth consists partly in what Taylor calls having “a good of 
its own”—precisely what I have been calling goodness for it. But it also entails, 
according to Taylor, two moral judgments:
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 20 Ibid., pp. 75–76. 
 21 Ibid., p. 72.
 22 Tom Reagan, The Case for Animal Rights, updated and with a new preface (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), p. 236 (emphasis in original).
 23 Ibid., p. 243.
. . . (1) that the entity is deserving of moral concern and consideration . . . and (2) that 
all moral agents have a prima facie duty to promote or preserve the entity’s good as 
an end in itself.20 
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Such moral implications are not implicit in the biological facts; nor, as Taylor 
himself observes, are they entailed by the entity’s having a good of its own: 
One can acknowledge that an animal or plant has a good of its own and yet, consistently 
with this acknowledgement, deny that moral agents have a duty to promote or protect 
its good or even to refrain from harming it. One does not contradict oneself by saying, 
“Yes I know that this action of mine will adversely affect the good of living things, 
but nevertheless there is no reason why I shouldn’t do it.”21
Inherent worth in Taylor’s sense is thus nonanthropogenic goodness-for conjoined 
with a certain moral status—which, more generally, Taylor describes as worthi-
ness of respect. This moral status is not itself a distinct form of goodness. It is, 
rather, a requirement on moral agents that they respect entities that have goods 
of their own. To assert, as Taylor does, that all living things have inherent worth 
is therefore to move not merely from is to good, as in our previous examples, but 
from an is (being a living thing) to both a good (having a good of its own) and an 
ought (being such that agents ought to respect it). 
 Moreover, although Taylor rightly holds that having a good of one’s own is non an-
thro pogenic, he never claims that respect-worthiness is likewise nonanthropogenic. 
On the contrary, as I show below, there is strong reason to regard it as anthropo-
genic. 
 Regan too advocates what he calls “a distinctive kind of value,” inherent value.22 
But this value is, like inherent worth in Taylor’s sense, a hybrid that inte grates 
the familiar goodness-for with moral considerations. Inherent value, according to 
Regan, is possessed by all subjects-of-a-life. Subjects-of-a-life are animals that are 
capable of at least rudimentary forms of conscious self-concern:
. . . they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the 
future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of 
pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate ac-
tion in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; 
and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or 
ill for them. . . . Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves 
have a distinctive kind of value—inherent value.23
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 25 Perfectionism is not the only alternative. Moreover, the argument neglects the possibility that the 
inherent value of subjects of a life may be neither equal nor of varying commensurable degrees but 
incommensurable.
 26 Ibid., chap. 4.
Simply put, if how an animal’s life fares matters to it, then it has inherent value. If 
this were all there was to it, Regan’s talk of inherent value would be nothing more 
than talk of goodness-for—of harms and benefits to the individual animal. It is, to 
be sure, goodness-for of a special kind; when an animal is consciously concerned 
about harms and benefits to itself, that concern adds a new level of complexity to 
its value (more of this in the next section). But the value, the good, is still value 
for the animal itself. 
 There is, however, more to inherent value than this, because Regan insists 
that all subjects-of-a-life have it equally. This is indefensible if inherent value is 
supposed to be nonanthropogenic—that is, if it is supposed to be independent of 
human values—for nonhuman nature nowhere offers evidence for the equality of 
any sort of value. Regan (quite rightly) does not argue for the equality of inherent 
value by claiming, for example, that each subject-of-a-life has the precisely same 
degree of self-concern. He argues instead that subjects-of-a-life must have equal 
inherent value because the only plausible alternative, perfectionism (the view that 
their value is proportional to their virtues), “pave[s] the way for” a theory of justice 
that permits ethically unacceptable forms of subjugation.24 This argument is flawed, 
but its particular flaws need not detain us.25 The crucial point for our purposes is 
that it mixes the demands of an anthropogenic theory of justice with the notion 
that subjects-of-a-life have a nonanthropogenic value for themselves.
 This might not disturb Regan. His methodology is holistic and pragmatic, giv-
ing considerable weight not only to the facts of science, but also to our reflective 
intuitions—especially moral intuitions26—and modern western reflective intuitions 
are anti-perfectionist and egalitarian. But if subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent 
value not solely in virtue of facts about them, but rather because a humanly devel-
oped value of justice requires that they have it, then that equality is anthropogenic. 
If the equality of inherent value is anthropogenic, then the inherent value itself must 
be anthropogenic, at least insofar as it has a definite quantity.
 For similar reasons, inherent worth in Taylor’s sense is most plausibly regarded 
as anthropogenic, for Taylor, too, is an egalitarian:
. . . if inherent worth is attributed to any wild creature just in virtue of its being a mem-
ber of the biotic community of a natural ecosystem, then each wild animal or plant 
is understood to have the same status as a moral subject to which duties are owed by 
moral agents. whatever its species may be, none is to be thought superior to another 
and all are held to be deserving of equal consideration.
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As with Regan, this equality of respect-worthiness seems, if defensible at all, to 
be a construct of an anthropogenic sense of justice. The biological facts provide 
no evidence for it. Taylor infers it from the premise that no living thing is mor-
ally superior to (more worthy of respect than) any other.27 But it does not follow 
from this premise, for two reasons (1) there may be no nonanthropogenic facts of 
the matter at all about respect-worthiness and (2) even if there are, the respect-
worthiness of some creatures may be incommensurable with (and hence not equal 
to) the respect-worthiness of others.
 In sum, both Regan’s conception of inherent value and Taylor’s conception of 
inherent worth incorporate moral considerations that are most plausibly regarded 
as anthropogenic. If we bracket these, then we do indeed arrive at something 
nonanthropogenic, but it seems to be just the entity’s value for itself—and hence 
a good of category (1B). 
 Could we not, however, interpret inherent value as a good of category (2)—that 
is a free-floating good, one that is not good for anything? Not very plausibly. The 
obstacle here is Occam’s Razor. All biotic entities that have inherent value also 
have goods of their own. These goods-for seem sufficient to account for whatever 
nonanthropogenic goodness is possessed by the entity and also—as Taylor and 
Regan both agree—to make it an appropriate object of human respect. we should 
not, then, posit in addition some free-floating good for which we have no compel-
ling argument.
 In sum, neither Regan nor Taylor offers us a conception of nonanthropogenic 
value distinct from goodness for the biotic entities that possess that value. Many 
other conceptions of inherent value are no doubt possible; but, by the reasoning of 
the previous section, I doubt that they are defensible.
GOODNESS FOR SENTIENT ANIMALS (HEDONIC GOODNESS)
 Sentient animals have the same sorts of fundamental goods that non-sentient 
organisms do: survival, nutriment, defense against predators, etc. But overlain upon 
these fundamental values is a novel value structure in which pleasure has intrinsic 
value and suffering intrinsic disvalue. 
 Natural selection, of course, tends to correlate pleasures with conditions beneficial 
to species survival (e.g., copulation, eating, drinking, care for young) and suffer-
ing with conditions that are deleterious (e.g., injury, poisoning, disease). Hence, 
pleasure and suffering are generally of instrumental value for the species—and 
often, insofar as the welfare of the animal is beneficial for the species, beneficial 
for the animal itself. The pain that an animal feels in an injured limb, for example, 
motivates it to immobilize the limb, which facilitates healing, and also to avoid 
thereafter the cause of the injury. 
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 But suffering also has an intrinsic disvalue for the animal and pleasure an intrinsic 
value. These hedonic values are the subject of such special is-to-good principles as:
 For sentient animals, pleasure itself is good and suffering itself is bad,
and
 For sentient animals, it is good not to suffer pointlessly.
Such principles express empirical truths. we are all acquainted with the qualitative 
goodness of pleasure—even pleasure that has bad consequences—and the qualita-
tive badness of suffering—even suffering that has good consequences. There are, 
of course, debates about how far we can generalize this knowledge, which ani-
mals are sentient, and how we can know that they are. There are also issues about 
whether and how various degrees of self-awareness modify hedonic values. But 
none of these disputes seriously threatens to dislodge sentience as a valid source 
of is-to-good principles. 
GOODNESS FOR NON-SENTIENT ORGANISMS AS 
HEALTHY ACHIEVEMENT OF LIFE-CYCLE STAGES
 The boldest challenges raised by environmental ethicists to established theories 
of value rely, of course, on moves from is to good for non-sentient entities. yet, 
these moves, too, can be elementary and empirical. It is an observable fact, for 
example, that rich, moist soil is good for certain fungi. Still, to make such moves 
systematically—that is, to formulate a general characterization of goodness for 
non-sentient organisms—is not easy. Taylor has suggested that goodness for non-
sentient organisms amounts just to healthy achievement of all normal life-cycle 
stages:
 28 Ibid., pp. 66–67.
A butterfly that develops through the egg, larva, and pupa stages of its life in a nor-
mal manner, and then emerges as a healthy adult that carries on its existence under 
favorable environmental conditions, might well be said to thrive and prosper. It fares 
well, successfully adapting to its physical surroundings and maintaining the normal 
biological functions of its species throughout its entire span of life. when all these 
things are true of it, we are warranted in concluding that the good of this particular 
insect has been fully realized. . . . All the foregoing considerations hold true of plants 
as well as animals.28
But achievement of all stages of the life cycle, though generally good for some-
thing, is not always good for the organism itself. Consider, for example, the stage 
of reproduction. Most non-sentient organisms have no interaction with their offspring 
and so cannot benefit from them, and reproduction often weakens the parent, makes 
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it more vulnerable, or even destroys it. In some species of spiders and insects, for 
example, after the male inseminates the female, she devours him. This is good for 
the female (she gets a nutritious meal) and perhaps also for the eventual offspring 
and the species, but it can hardly be said to be good for the male. Clearly, then, 
achievement of all normal life-cycle stages is not in all cases good for the organ-
ism itself.
GOODNESS AS CONTRIBUTION TO AUTOPOIETIC FUNCTIONING
 To characterize goodness for the organism itself, we must distinguish two sorts of 
functions that organisms perform by evolutionary “design.” I call these the autopoietic 
and (to coin a term) “exopoietic functions.” “Autopoietic functions” of organisms 
are those that establish, maintain, or enhance their survivability—functions such 
as capturing sunlight or prey, resisting disease, obtaining water from the environ-
ment, respirating, healing injuries, eliminating wastes, and so on. An organism’s 
“exopoietic functions” are those that establish, maintain, or enhance the survivability 
of some related biotic entity—the organism’s offspring, for example, its social 
group, its species, or perhaps even (if Dawkins is right29) its genes. Reproduction 
is exopoietic, functioning to enhance the survivability not of the organism itself, 
but of its species.30 The sting of the honeybee is also exopoietic, but it operates on 
the social level, serving the hive as a defense against intruders but fatal to the bee 
itself. Even natural death might function exopoietically at the species level, since 
it provides for species renewal and helps to maintain population equilibrium. 
 Both autopoietic and exopoietic functions are products of evolutionary adap-
tation. In exopoiesis, an organism functions not for its own benefit, but rather 
for the benefit of something related to it, to which it is therefore of instrumental 
value. But not every sort of instrumental value is exopoiesis, for an organism’s 
functions count as exopoietic only if they are shaped by its evolutionary “design.” 
A prey species, for example, is of instrumental value (as a source of nutrients) to 
its predators. But that instrumental value is not exopoiesis on the part of the prey, 
since natural selection does not “design” the prey to function as prey. Quite the 
contrary: selection works to improve the prey species’ ability to avoid predation. 
It is only through the designs of the predator that the prey species becomes prey. 
 The distinction between autopoietic and exopoietic functions facilitates a more 
satisfactory definition of “goodness for non-sentient organisms”—a definition that 
is also a move from is to good: 
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 30 It may also serve other levels of organization, such as the organism’s social group or the isolated 
population of which it is a member.
A condition is good for a non-sentient organism to the extent to which it 
contributes to the organism’s autopoietic functioning. 
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Contribution to autopoietic functioning is also typically good for sentient organisms, 
though for them value is complicated by the additional layer of hedonic goods. 
These complications, however, need not concern us here.
 Autopoietic functioning has itself a kind of instrumental value; it is valuable in 
that it enhances the organism’s chances for survival. This, of course, is just what 
evolutionary theory leads us to expect, since survival (to reproductive age, at least) 
is the standard to which natural selection “designs” an organism’s autopoietic 
functions. But survival itself is of instrumental value as a necessary condition for 
the attainment of further goods—that is, for further autopoietic functioning. Thus, 
instrumentality flows from autopoietic functioning to survival and from survival 
back to autopoietic functioning, in a closed loop of value. The loop is tightened 
by the realization that survival and the capacity for autopoietic functioning are the 
same thing, for total loss of the capacity for autopoietic functioning is, precisely, 
death. The loop, then, comes down to this: autopoietic functioning for the sake of 
further autopoietic functioning. 
 we may wonder whether such a Sisyphean “good” is really good at all. Yet, plainly 
it is. Consider any representative instance: an abundance of plankton is good for 
jellyfish, for example, because it contributes to their nutriment and hence to their 
autopoietic functioning, which helps them survive; and their survival is good for 
them in that enables them to realize further goods. 
 Still, the good of any individual non-sentient organism seems relatively insig-
nificant. For greater significance, we must turn to broader contexts.
GOODNESS FOR BIOTIC ENTITIES GENERALLy  
 Organisms function not only autopoietically to enhance their own survivability, 
but also exopoietically to enhance the survivability of related entities, often at dif-
ferent levels of biological organization: their species, their colony, their offspring, 
their organs, their cells, etc. But these other entities, too, may have their own 
autopoietic or exopoietic functions. An ant acts exopoietically for the benefit of 
its colony, but the colony as a whole functions autopoietically, maintaining itself 
through the functioning of its members. The colony also has exopoietic functions; 
it may reproduce itself, for example, by creating daughter colonies.
 The fact that autopoiesis occurs not just in organisms but at many levels of 
biological organization tells against the biocentric individualist thesis that good-
ness resides specifically in organisms. Goodness can in fact be found wherever 
there is autopoietic functioning. we may thus assert this very general is-to-good 
principle:
For biotic entities that can function autopoietically, what contributes to that 
functioning is good.
For each such entity, autopoiesis is instrumental for survival, which in turn is 
instrumental for further autopoiesis. Hence, the cycle of autopoiesis for the sake 
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of further autopoiesis is a structure that occurs not just at the organismic level, but 
at many levels of biological organization. 
THE REALM OF NONANTHROPOGENIC GOODNESS
 Value in nature is not, however, merely an ensemble of autopoietic cycles, one 
for each such entity, for the cycles are interlaced by forward-flowing and lateral 
streams of exopoiesis. To put this less metaphorically, biotic entities typically 
function to promote not only their own good but also both the goods of any future 
entities to which they will contribute via reproduction and the goods of other entities 
to which they are related, often at other levels of biological organization. Colonies, 
organisms, cells, and genes all reproduce, benefiting their descendants (forward-
flowing streams leading to new cycles).31 Cells, organs, and organisms function 
for the benefit of the organs, organisms, or species of which they are components; 
conversely, organisms or colonies function for the benefit of their component cells, 
organs or organisms (criss-crossing lateral streams). 
 Let’s call the totality of goods accomplished for a biotic entity by its autopoietic 
functioning its “autopoietic benefits” and the totality of goods accomplished for 
other entities by its exopoietic functioning its “exopoietic benefits.” An entity’s 
exopoietic benefits can be extensive. A single cell functions expoietically to benefit 
not only the organ of which it is a part, but the organ system of which that organ is 
a part and the organism of which that organ system is a part. If that cell contributes 
to the organism’s survival to reproductive age, then it also contributes to the lives 
of all the organism’s descendants (by helping to ensure that they receive the organ-
ism’s genetic code, if in no other way) and to the continuation of its species. 
 So long as a biotic entity has descendants, its exopoietic benefits and those of its 
functional components are perpetuated. An entity’s exopoeitic benefits can therefore 
easily exceed its autopoietic benefits—what some might call its “intrinsic value.” 
This is unreflectively obvious for those entities, such as cells or organs, that are 
mere components of organisms. But it is also true of organisms themselves. Goods 
that you and I enjoy today—the basic structures of the digits on our hands and feet, 
for example—are among the exopoietic benefits of a particular ancient reptile that 
was our common ancestor; for that reptile initiated a reproductive sequence whose 
benefits (including certain genes responsible for the structures of our hands and 
feet) we inherited. An entity’s exopoietic benefits may even include contributions 
to the evolution of new varieties of value, such as those associated with sentience 
or rationality.
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I mean by saying that a reproducing entity benefits its offspring is that it provides them with some of 
its substance, some stored energy, and genetic information, all of which contribute to their autopoietic 
functioning. If it is an organism, it might provide other benefits as well—a cocoon, web, nest, other 
form of shelter, feeding, protection from predators, etc.
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 Of course, our reptile ancestor is not solely responsible for the genes that have 
shaped our hands and feet or any other benefit we inherit from it. That ancestor had 
a mate, and we are descended not only from the two of them, but from all of their 
ancestors and many of their progeny. we inherit exopoietic benefits collectively 
from all these creatures, and so do many other biotic entities. The reptile pair’s 
exopoietic benefits extend to all their descendants until now—and all those that will 
arise in the future. Thus, so long as life has much of a future, the totality of goods 
for all the biotic entities alive at a given time is less than their eventual exopoietic 
benefits to related entities. On average, then, the exopoietic benefits of a biological 
entity exceed its autopoietic benefits. Life’s value lies largely in its future.
 The value of a biotic entity is not exhausted, however, by its autopoietic and 
exopoietic benefits, for they are merely the sorts of goods evolution has “designed” 
it to promote. while an entity functions autopoietically to benefit itself and ex-
opoietically to benefit related entities, it may also be used by still other entities, for 
which it serves as prey, shelter, a host, and so on. Consider, for example, the great 
number and variety of organisms that utilize a tree—not by the tree’s “design” 
but by “designs” of their own. For these organisms, the tree has non-exopoietic 
instrumental value. Like autopoiesis and exopoiesis, non-exopoietic instrumental 
value occurs at various levels of biological organization. Thus, the total value of a 
biotic entity includes:
(1) The value for it of its autopoiesis;
(2) The value for related entities of its exopoiesis; and
(3) Its non-exopoietic instrumental value for other biotic entities.
This list is probably not exhaustive. Sentience and rationality introduce novel forms 
of value that may not be reducible to one of these three types.
 One more value source must be recognized, for the nonliving world also contributes 
to a biotic entity’s good. Biotic entities, in other words, need non-biotic resources, 
which thus become values for them. Some of these values are universal, or nearly 
so; water, for example, in one form or another, is a good for all biotic entities—at 
least on this planet. So are the atmosphere, the heat of the sun, and various minerals 
from the Earth’s crust. The functioning of many organisms depends on the regular 
alternation of day and night, the cycles of seasons, or the phases of the moon. Such 
non-biotic phenomena have no inherent value (if there had been no life, they would 
have been valueless), but their instrumental value is very great. 
 Thus, in addition to the three forms of value of a biotic entity just mentioned, 
there are at least four forms of value for a biotic entity:
(1) The value for it of its autopoiesis;
(2) The value for it of the exopoietic functions of related entities;
(3) The non-exopoietic instrumental value other biotic entities have for it; and
(4) The instrumental value that non-biotic entities have for it.
Summer 2009 153
Again, because rationality and sentience introduce additional goods-for, this list is 
not exhaustive.
 Still, these two lists suffice, I think, to indicate the richness of the “realm of 
nonanthropogenic goodness”—goodness that is independent of us, our minds, and 
our cultures. Very general is-to-good principles are true of this realm—the principles, 
for example, that water is a good for all earthly biotic entities or that the value of 
life lies largely in its future (assuming that it has a future). In the final section of 




 Are there other forms of nonanthropogenic value that this survey has overlooked? 
Does nature contain, for example, non-biotic entities that have goods of their own? 
In part this is a question about the boundaries of the concept “biotic entity.” I have 
deliberately left these vague. Organisms and their functional components are clearly 
included. So are species. (I am aware of the difficulties of saying exactly what a 
species is, but species have identity enough to count as entities, and their good is 
not reducible to the goods of their members.32) with regard to whether ecosystems, 
the biosphere, Gaia and the like count as biotic entities or whether they have goods 
of their own, I am skeptical on both counts, but I can’t do these matters justice 
here. I would insist only that if such entities have evolved enough functionality so 
that things can be good or bad for them (as distinct from their components), then 
they also count as biotic entities.
 Might there not be categories of value entirely distinct from any considered 
here? Rolston, for example, argues for the recognition of a third category of value 
distinct from intrinsic and instrumental value, which he calls “systemic value.” A 
possible example, he thinks, is the regulation of insect populations by warblers. 
The benefits of such regulation are so widely distributed that one might think of 
them as benefits for an entire ecosystem; but that is not the line Rolston takes, for 
he does not think that ecosystems are “value holders.” what makes systemic value 
distinct, he says, is that it is “not all encapsulated in individuals,” but “smeared 
out into the system.” It is “the productive process” whose “products are intrinsic 
values woven into instrumental relationships.”33 These metaphors are dense, but I 
can discern nothing in them that was not mentioned in the previous section of this 
paper. The goods catalogued there need not be goods for individuals (since not all 
biotic entities are individuals) and their exopoietic ramification (“smearing” out 
into the system?) is productive. Hence, I see no need to regard systemic value as 
anything beyond the realm of nonanthropogenic value described above.
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 One might wonder, too, about the value of biodiversity. The principle that 
diversity is inherently good—and hence that a more diverse world is inherently 
better than a less diverse one, even apart from diversity’s benefits to the worlds’ 
inhabitants—has a venerable pedigree. It underlies the long-held belief that the 
world, being the product of a divine Creator, ought to be as diverse as possible—an 
idea that Arthur O. Lovejoy dubbed “the principle of plentitude.”34 But as Lovejoy 
shows, this ancient principle, originally grounded in the Platonic equation of being 
with goodness, is today without foundation. Biodiversity is valuable, of course, 
but I see no reason to think that its nonanthropogenic value is not of kinds already 
considered here.
INTEGRATION OF IS-TO-GooD wITH GooD-TO-OUGHT PRINCIPLES
 In this paper, I have examined justifications of moves from is to good in en-
vironmental ethics. I have so far said nothing about how human agents ought to 
act with respect to these goods. Here I indicate briefly how I think environmental 
ethics can benefit from this examination of is-to-good moves.
 To begin, note that if environmental ethics is to reason from is to good and thence 
to ought (a pattern that is common and promising, though not compulsory), then 
that reasoning will yield the strongest conclusions when it uses the most general 
is-to-good and good-to-ought moves that are defensible. 
 The most general is-to-good moves that are defensible are, as I have argued 
here, those that recognize not just the goods of subjects of a life, sentient animals 
or organisms, but those of the entire realm of nonanthropogenic goodness. 
 I have not discussed the justification of moves from good to ought here, but in 
previous work I suggested that the most promising justification for duties to respect 
natural goods—understood now as the realm of nonanthropogenic goodness—lies 
in the value to human beings of self-transcendence.35 If so, then the upshot will be 
an ethic of self-transcendence toward the realm of nonanthropogenic goodness. I 
plan to develop such an ethic in future work.
 34 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961).
 35 Nolt, “The Move from Good to Ought in Environmental Ethics,”  pp. 371–73. 
